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The conception that the world can be represented as a system of levels of being can be traced back to 
the beginnings of European philosophy and has lost little of its plausibility in the meantime. One of the 
important modern conceptions of levels was developed by Nicolai Hartmann. It exhibits remarkable 
similarities and contrasts with the classification of the real developed by Werner Heisenberg in his 
paper Ordnung der Wirklichkeit (Order of Reality). In my contribution I will introduce these two con-
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the shortcomings of these conceptions can be remedied by extending them with the level of the very 
small and that of the very large. The introduction of these ontologically fundamental levels is based on 
scientific knowledge that for the most part eludes the intuitively representable character of lifeworld 
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Представление о том, что мир может быть представлен как система уровней бытия, восходит 
к  истокам европейской философии и  мало утратило за это время своей правдоподобности. 
Одна из важных современных концепций таких уровней была разработана Николаем Гартма-
ном. Эта концепция демонстрирует замечательные сходства и различия с классификацией ре-
ального, разработанной Вернером Гейзенбергом в его статье Ordnung der Wirklichkeit (Порядок 
реальности). В своей статье я представлю две концепции уровней и сравню их характерные 
черты. Я буду обсуждать их как варианты научного мировоззрения, которое пытается устано-
вить связь с точкой зрения жизненного мира. Далее я покажу, что недостатки этих концепций 
можно исправить, расширив их до микроуровня и макроурвня. Введение этих онтологически 
фундаментальных уровней основано на научном знании, которое по большей части ускользает 
от интуитивно представимого характера жизненного опыта. Исторические изменения в науке 
и  жизненном мире могут привести к  тому, что реальность может быть представлена в  виде 
системы уровней, которые будут поставлены под сомнение в будущем.
Ключевые слова: Николай Гартман, Вернер Гейзенберг, уровень, слой, стратовая реальность, на-
учное мировоззрение, мир жизни, Вселенная, субатомное.
1. INTRODUTION
The conception that the world can be represented as a system of levels of being 
can be traced back to the beginnings of European philosophy and has lost little of its 
plausibility in the meantime. Democritus’s atomism can be seen as an early represent-
ative of the idea of levels (Hartmann, 1942, 44). An invisible level of atoms gives rise 
to the level of visible objects. Here one can speak of levels insofar as atoms and visible 
objects can be differentiated through different types of properties. Democritus’s at-
oms differ only in size, shape and location; the visible objects have in contrast, even if 
only apparently, a variety of qualitative properties. In Aristotle we find a non-atom-
istic conception of levels that distinguishes between inanimate and animate bodies, 
and subdivides the latter according to the functions of nutrition and procreation, of 
perception and of thinking (Hartmann, 1943, 180  ff.; Schiemann, 2005, 42  ff.). In 
this way he explains the difference between lifeless matter, motionless plants, sentient 
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animals and human beings endowed with mental capabilities. Although Aristotle ac-
knowledges that there are diverse transitions between these four levels, he neverthe-
less insists on the fundamental qualitative differences between them. René Descartes 
later turned against Aristotle’s classification of reality by contrasting extended bodies 
with non-extended mind, two substances that can also be understood as ontological 
levels and continue to influence contemporary thought in the modified form of body-
mind dualism. 
It was only during the twentieth century that the scientific conceptions of lev-
els began to detach themselves from ones founded on lifeworld experience. Life-
world-based notions of levels are distinguished by the immediacy of their contents 
and the taken-for-grantedness with which they understand their objects — that is, 
by properties that are at odds with the non-intuitive and critical character of modern 
scientific knowledge. Today, depending on the context, we can draw on a plurality of 
lifeworld-based conception of levels in the quest for better orientation in the world. 
Sometimes the Aristotelian division into four parts, at others the Cartesian bipartite 
division — to mention just two among the examples cited — can be applied better1. 
Over the past century, qualitative distinctions were exposed to scientific criticism and 
traditional conceptions of levels were reformulated accordingly and new approaches 
developed2. Nicolai Hartmann’s and Werner Heisenberg’s conceptions of levels are 
prime examples of the interplay of these tendencies. A striking shared feature is that 
they remain oriented to lifeworld notions to an extent that is no longer justifiable 
from a contemporary scientific perspective. If one wants to uphold the claim to grasp 
the world as a whole, one must accept the existence of levels of reality that elude life-
world — i.e. above all intuitively representable — experience.
Nicolai Hartmann’s doctrine that the world exhibits a level structure draws 
expressly on historical predecessors and seeks to combine them with contemporary 
knowledge in two ways. On the one hand, he wants to provide orientation for the 
lifeworld endeavor of “finding one’s bearings in the world” (Hartmann, 1946, 63)3. On 
the other hand, his New Ontology wants to take into account the progress in scientific 
1 See Schiemann (2005, 3 ff.), although the operative concept of the life-world there is narrower, so 
that it only allows for a limited application of Cartesian dualism.
2 For criticism, see (Stephan, 1999, 129–155), on notions of levels in the context of theories of emer-
gence, see (Heil, 2005, 17–49); reformulations are presented by Hartmann and Heisenberg; an ex-
ample of a new approach is the physical concept of the “quasi-autonomous domain,” on which see 
(Robinson, 1992).
3 Hartmann does not speak of the lifeworld, but of the “natural” worldview, by which he means the 
same thing.
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knowledge. Hartmann’s aim is to unify knowledge based on lifeworld experience with 
scientific knowledge. The ‘theory of categories,’ he writes, “finds its objects in all areas 
of life and science” (Hartmann, 1940, 15). It does not adopt the conceptions of every-
day understanding and science uncritically, but instead subjects them to analysis and 
evaluation for the purposes of the theory of categories.
Where Hartmann deviates from the assertions of science on specific questions, 
he feels compelled to provide detailed justifications for his positions. The fact that he 
repeatedly draws parallels between the structure of his theory of the levels of the real 
world and the division of the academic scientific disciplines can be interpreted as an 
indication of how much he takes his orientation from the knowledge of the individual 
sciences. The theory of levels, the main result of his theory of categories, asserts that 
the real world is composed of the four superimposed levels of inorganic (anorganisch), 
biological (organisch), psychological (seelisch) and spiritual (geistig). This division of 
being into “heterogeneous spheres of objects” means that 
the sciences, in like manner, split up into interrelated groups of fields according to the 
same differences. From the fields of exact knowledge of inorganic nature the biological 
sciences are set off by a clear demarcation line. These are followed by psychology with 
its various branches, from which in turn the Geisteswissenschaften proper distinguish 
themselves… (Hartmann, 1953, 46; cf. Hartmann, 1942, 38)
When it comes to assessing Hartmann’s claim to have captured the system of 
science and its findings in a theory of categories it may be helpful to compare his 
theory of levels with approaches that also claim to divide reality into levels, but were 
formulated by scientists from other disciplines. One such approach, which moreover 
was developed around the same time and in the same cultural environment, can be 
found in a manuscript by Werner Heisenberg, which was published posthumously 
under the title Ordnung der Wirklichkeit (Order of Reality)4. In this work, Heisenberg 
develops a model of reality which, in its mode of justification and its classification, 
exhibits certain affinities with Hartmann’s ontology5. Heisenberg is also concerned 
both to establish a connection with a lifeworld-based understanding and to process 
scientific findings in a critical way. When it comes to its extension, his division of re-
ality coincides for the most part with Hartmann’s four levels, as I will show. 
4 The manuscript was first published in Heisenberg (1984) and is also available as Heisenberg (1989).
5 Höfert (1952) also highlights the affinity between Heisenberg’s conception of closed theory and 
Hartmann’s theory of categories. Heisenberg’s conception of levels can be seen as a generalization 
of his earlier notion of closed theories; see (Schiemann, 2008, 70 ff., 90).
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However, the appeal of the comparison resides less in the similarities than in 
the differences between and the resulting desiderata of the two conceptions. Unlike 
Hartmann, Heisenberg does not understand his model of levels as a continuation and 
summation of previous efforts, but as a break with mainstream philosophical tra-
ditions. In the historical development of attempts to determine the structure of the 
world he sees, not a general tendency leading in the long run to an approach to the 
truth (Hartmann, 1940, 33), but instead deep discontinuities between the possibilities 
of thematization in successive epochs (Heisenberg, 1984, 218; cf. Heisenberg, 1984, 
277, 295, 304 ff.). Heisenberg’s motivation for looking for a structure of the world is 
therefore in a sense the exact opposite of Hartmann’s intentions. He does not inquire 
into an epoch-spanning orientation, but into an epoch-specific characterization of the 
world that is unavoidably hypothetical because it may lose its validity in the future. 
Hartmann’s theory of levels has also not been able to avoid a historical change that, 
in a completely different way than he himself probably assumed, has invalidated the 
basic structures of his categorical analysis.
Among the differences between the two approaches is in addition the fact that 
Heisenberg made much less of an effort to justify his approach than Hartmann and 
that his brief remarks at times remain vague. His slim manuscript of about 140 print-
ed pages was probably written in the early 1940s during the summer holidays that he 
spent at his house near Urfeld. Heisenberg himself described his text, perhaps also on 
account of some weaknesses of form and content, as ‘private’ and ‘personal.’ 6 Although 
not explicitly described as such, the writing has the character of a legacy in which Hei-
senberg, in case he did not survive the Third Reich, communicates his worldview to 
posterity. Although the manuscript represents the most coherent elaboration of Hei-
senberg’s philosophical ideas, the scope and depth of its systematic elaboration can 
hardly be compared with Hartmann’s doctrine. Conversely, Hartmann’s conceptual 
precision provides a critical yardstick that can also be applied to Heisenberg’s model.
Finally, a comparison of the two conceptions of levels also brings to light short-
comings that can be traced back in part to subsequent developments in individu-
al scientific fields and in part to subsequent changes in the self-evident cultural as-
sumptions that shape everyday practice. Some of the weaknesses could be rectified by 
adapting the conceptions to changed conditions of knowledge. In this context, I will 
propose that two new levels should be introduced that extend the two conceptions 
and at the same time reveal their limits. The proposed levels frame the conceptions of 
Hartmann and Heisenberg, as it were, and thus situate them within a new framework 
6 References in (Schiemann, 2008, 85).
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of meaning. However, one can also formulate fundamental reservations concerning 
their positions that point toward an order of reality that rejects a level conception.
In my contribution I will first introduce the two conceptions of levels and then 
offer a more detailed comparison and critical discussion of them. I will thematize the 
two conceptions as variants of a scientific worldview that attempts to forge a connec-
tion with the lifeworld perspective. In the final section, I will return to the relationship 
between the worldviews of science and of the lifeworld, which Hartmann and Heisen-
berg assume to be unproblematic.
2. HARTMANN
Hartmann’s commitment to the philosophical tradition and his simultaneous 
recourse to the lifeworld perspective are exemplified by how he introduces the four 
levels. In everyday practice, he writes, it is evident that the “multiplicity of forms [of 
the world…] constitutes a realm of steps [Stufenreich]” (Hartmann, 1953, 43 (trans-
lation amended); cf. Hartmann, 1942, 36)7. Moreover, he is not in any doubt that his 
approach to determining the system of levels, which he borrows from modern philos-
ophy, is for the most part plausible from the perspective of the lifeworld. Appealing 
to Descartes’ metaphysics, he first divides reality into a spatial external world and a 
non-spatial inner world. While Hartmann assumes that the subsequent division of 
the external world into inorganic and biological domains is also a matter of common 
knowledge, he does not think that the spitting of the inner world into the psycholog-
ical and spiritual domains is equally intelligible. According to Hartmann, the psycho-
logical, or that which can only be experienced by the individual, was first brought 
to light by psychological research together with the demarcation from the spiritual, 
which refers to all intersubjectively accessible phenomena of conscious life (Hart-
mann, 1940, 189 ff.; Hartmann, 1942, 37; Hartmann, 1946, 73 ff.). Hartmann subdi-
vides the spiritual into the three component levels of personal (persönlich), objective 
(objektiv) and objectified (objektiviert) spirit. Personal spirit comprehends the life of 
consciousness belonging to a person, objective spirit refers to collective achievements 
that rest on accomplishments of personal spirit (language, law, custom, morality and 
7 The difference between lifeworld and scientific level conceptions, according to Hartmann, is that 
the former is ‘not fundamental enough,’ because it only comprehends ‘formations (thing, organism, 
human being, etc.),’ but not levels of being (Hartmann, 1953, 44; cf. Hartmann 1940, 188 ff.; Heisen-
berg, 1984, 232 ff.), makes a comparable distinction between a ‘classification of things (in the most 
general sense)’ and a scientific ‘system of law-governed connections.’ The term Stufe (step), which 
Hartmann and Heisenberg use synonymously with Schicht (level, stratum), is more suggestive than 
the latter term of a hierarchical structure, which can usually be justified only with qualifications. 
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science) (Hartmann, 1942, 64), and by objectified spirit is meant “the formation that 
[…] personal or objective […] spirit has created in the world of sense” (buildings, 
infrastructures, works of art, books, and so forth) (Bollnow, 1982, 72).
In his further reflections, Hartmann in no way questions the general plausibility 
of dividing up the world along categorial lines. The scope of the sections of his works in 
which he presents this classification as an established fact is negligible compared to his 
detailed descriptions of the individual levels and the relationships between them. With 
the exception of the psychological level, Hartmann devoted separate monographs both 
to the systems of categories of individual and several levels and to the relationships be-
tween them (Hartmann, 1933; Hartmann, 1940; Hartmann, 1950) (cf. Fig. 1).
inorganic level
(including the cosmic phenomena)
biological level
psychological level
level of personal spirit
(personal life of consciousness)
level of objective spirit
(language, law, custom, morality and science)
level of objectified spirit
(buildings, infrastructures, works of art, books, etc.)
Fig. 1: Hartmann’s division of the real world. The natural domain has a 
white, the non-natural domain a grey background. The thin line symboliz-
es a relation of super-formation (Überformungsverhältnis), the thick lines 
stand for a relation of super-position (Überbauungsverhältnis) between 
two levels. Terms in brackets are for explanatory purposes only.
Each of the levels is characterized by a system of categories, whereby the justifi-
cation of the selection of the individual categories is not demonstrated in a systematic 
way and it varies according to context. To each level belong categories whose occur-
rence is specific to that level alone. Hartmann considers the properties designated by 
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these categories to be irreducible — that is, they cannot be explained in terms of the 
properties of the other levels. In that regard, one can specify the necessary (but not 
sufficient) conditions not identified by Hartman himself for introducing further lev-
els — namely, to demonstrate properties of the world that could not be explained in 
terms of any of the properties already represented by categories8.
Every level shares categories with another level. Levels do not exist in isolation 
from other levels, but form a system of interrelated levels that is held together as a 
whole by the so-called fundamental categories, which are the only ones shared by all 
levels. The relationships between the individual levels are described by a complex web 
of categorial laws that ensure the hierarchical connection and structure of the levels. 
From the variety of determinations, I would like to select just the law of indifference. 
It states that only the lower ontological levels can exist independently of the higher 
ones. This means at the same time that the existence of every higher level presuppos-
es the existence of all of the levels that are lower relative to it (Hartmann, 1940, 520, 
529 ff.; Hartmann, 1942, 69, 73, 83). This law does not seem infallible to me. Although 
biological entities cannot exist without inorganic realities, it is questionable whether 
the existence of spiritual or psychological phenomena depends with the same kind of 
necessity on the existence of biological entities (Hartmann, 1942, 69; different word-
ing in Hartmann 1940, 520, 529 ff.)9. When Hartmann emphasizes that the determi-
nations of his doctrine of levels are merely hypothetical, he is thinking of individual 
categories or categorial laws, and does not entertain such far-reaching corrections as 
a partial invalidation of the law of indifference (Hartmann, 1940, 29 ff.; Hartmann, 
1950, 411 ff.)10.
3. HEISENBERG
The hypothetical character of Heisenberg’s conception extends as far as ques-
tioning the basic structure of its internal classification11. As already mentioned, Hei-
senberg’s model of levels sees itself as a countermodel to a previous conception of 
order, just as it allows for the possibility that it will be replaced by future, incommen-
8 The criterion does not have to be sufficient if the properties in question are situated on the bound-
aries of an already existing level.
9 Creating spiritual entities independent of organic reality can be regarded as the goal of the artificial 
intelligence research that I will discuss below.
10 Feyerabend (1963) shows that Hartmann (1950) does not justify his claim that his theory has a 
hypothetical character, but affirms it dogmatically.
11 On Heisenberg’s hypothetical view of science, see (Schiemann, 2009).
HORIZON 8 (1) 2019 111
surable conceptions of reality. Descartes’ division of the world into two parts also 
serves Heisenberg as the central philosophical point of reference for the introduction 
of his model. In contrast to Hartmann, however, he does not want to uphold the split 
between object and subject, but instead to overcome it. Eliminating this ontological 
separation is the guiding idea of his entire conception, which conceives of all levels 
as combinations of subjective and objective elements. The model for this is an idea of 
order developed by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe that classifies the “effects observed 
in experience […] in ascending order from the lower to the higher” in terms of nine 
properties: “accidental, mechanical, physical, chemical, organic, psychological, eth-
ical, religious, genial” (Heisenberg, 1984, 159, 232; Goethe, 1989, 788). This classi-
fication draws directly on lifeworld experience and serves Heisenberg to refute the 
assertion that pure objectivity or subjectivity can exist in isolation12.
By ‘objective’ Heisenberg means the “representation of a […] state of affairs” 
in which “the state of affairs in question […] can be detached from us and from its 
representation” (Heisenberg, 1984, 229). By ‘subjective,’ on the other hand, he means 
those descriptions where this is not possible to varying degrees (Heisenberg, 1984, 
235). His model of levels is spanned between an objective and a subjective pole. Start-
ing from the objective pole, the objectivity of the levels decreases ‘by increments’ in 
relation to their subjectivity (Heisenberg, 1984, 231).
As a physicist, Heisenberg has in mind here the paradigm of the object domains 
of certain theories from his own discipline. The epitome of a theory that raises a claim 
to objectivity is, for Heisenberg, classical physics (mechanics, electrodynamics, phe-
nomenological thermodynamics, special and general relativity), in which the describ-
ing subject does not feature in the descriptions of their objects. However, the price to 
be paid for this objectivity, according to Heisenberg, is subjectivity in the form of ide-
alizations that “through the intervention of our thought […] detach certain processes, 
phenomena, laws” from the reality under consideration (Heisenberg, 1984, 235 ff.). 
Since idealizations, which occur in all theories of reality, are comparatively speaking 
least important in classical physics, their object domain is the lowest, i.e. “most objec-
tive” level (Heisenberg, 1984, 236). The absolute belief in objectivity traditionally as-
sociated with its description, Heisenberg argues, has been shaken by modern atomic 
physics, in which no assertion is any longer independent of the measuring interven-
12 In fact, the lifeworld experience with which Goethe’s scheme can be correlated cannot be clearly 
divided into subjective and objective components. It is subjective insofar as it is arranged concen-
trically around the subjects from whose sensory perspective it proceeds; it is objective insofar as 
its subjectivity does not become thematic, whereby the general limits on the thematizability of the 
lifeworld also set limits to its objectivity.
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tion of the observer. Heisenberg correlates the subatomic and atomic processes with 
the so-called chemical level, since according to his conception all chemical processes 
can be explained in terms of subatomic and atomic processes. In the case of the modes 
of knowledge typical of the higher levels, the subject of knowledge can be less and less 
ignored. Similarly to Hartmann, Heisenberg first distinguishes between the biological 
and the inorganic levels, situates a level of consciousness above them and rounds off 
his model with levels that transcend individual consciousness (with increasing sub-
jectivity). The highest step is constituted by the level of creativity, in which the objects 
are pure products of subjectivity (Heisenberg, 1984, 246 ff.) (cf. Fig. 2).
(Objective Pole)
(Classical) Physics
(incl. theories of relativity)
Chemistry
(incl. chance)
Organic life
(incl. possibly the psyche)
Consciousness
Symbol and form
(language, art, science)
Creative powers
(incl. religion)
(Subjective pole)
Fig. 2: The classification of reality according to Heisenberg. The white 
background symbolizes proportions of objectivity, the gray background 
proportions of subjectivity of the levels of reality. Terms in brackets are for 
explanatory purposes only.
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Although the claim of the levels to overcome the object-subject split is con-
nected with a continuous construction principle, the transition between them is 
not continuous. With each level are correlated one or several notions correspond-
ing to specific experiences associated with its scientific investigation (Heisenberg, 
1984, 234). Like Hartmann, Heisenberg associates an anti-reductionist basic attitude 
with his model of levels, although this can no longer be demonstrated in his later 
writings13.
One point about his conception that Heisenberg does not discuss is that it can 
be read in an inverse way and thus is compatible with an opposite interpretation of 
the world. This possibility is rooted in the fact that his model is not independent of 
how it is presented. He describes his chosen determination of the levels, which starts 
from the objective pole and ascends to progressively more subjective levels, as “sci-
entific” (Heisenberg, 1984, 228 ff.). This conception of the world aims at objectivity 
comparable to a realistic representation, but it gradually loses its explanatory power 
as it progresses to the less objective levels. Conversely, an alternative, equally valid 
conception would descend from the subjective pole to the increasingly objective levels 
and, as it progressed, would be less and less able to explain the phenomena. Heisen-
berg describes this conception as ‘religious,’ and one can assume that he considers that 
its influence has waned in modern times. For the religious conception, the domains 
of scientific objectivity stand under the spell of the infinitely distant, forever incom-
prehensible opposite pole. 
It is not altogether clear from Heisenberg’s manuscript whether he considered 
his own scientific conception to be typical of the present or saw it as an anticipation 
of a new ordering structure that was only beginning to emerge. Among the indica-
tions of an epochal shift in the “foundations of thought” (Heisenberg, 1984, 304) he 
counts, in addition to the revolution in modern physics, also the social and cultur-
al changes in Germany before 1933 and the totalitarian regime of the ‘Third Reich’ 
(Heisenberg, 1984, 218, 304)14. In the post-war years, the technologization of the 
world acquired greater importance as an event that could bring about fundamen-
tal changes in conditions of existence (Heisenberg, 1984, 411; cf. Schiemann, 2008, 
86, 118 ff.).
13 Thus Heisenberg does not rule out in principle that holistic structures of life and its symbol-
ic capabilities could be explained in terms of physically unmeasurable forces (Heisenberg, 
1984, 260  ff.). This is also indicated by his talk of the “creative forces” (Heisenberg, 1984, 
294 ff.). 
14 Heisenberg does not use this term.
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4. COMPARISON AND EXTENSION OF  
THE CONCEPTIONS OF LEVELS
I have already mentioned some similarities and differences between the two 
conceptions. If we make a schematic comparison between the two systems, the first 
thing that strikes us is the similarity between their respective sequences of levels. The 
main reason for this commonality is that both authors reproduce elements of a world-
view rooted in the lifeworld that is generally taken for granted in Western culture15.
In both authors, the inorganic also includes the domain of the cosmic dimen-
sions. However, this commonality is goes hand-in-hand with profound differences. 
Whereas for Heisenberg the special and general theory of relativity, as part of classical 
physics, provides the basis for assertions about “very distant spaces […] and times,” 
(Heisenberg, 1984, 244) Hartmann refuses to take the consequences of relativity theo-
ries into account in his theory of levels. The conceptions also deviate from each other 
in the inorganic domain as a result of differences in their respective descriptions of 
the very small. For Heisenberg, the specific limits of the objectivity of the subatomic 
level support the introduction of a separate level, whereas Hartmann subsumes atom-
ic and subatomic reality under the level of the inorganic. 
For the organic level, it is striking that neither author provides any concepts for 
distinguishing between plants and animals. Heisenberg could have made this differ-
entiation in terms of his broad notion of consciousness, since it allows for the possi-
bility that animals, but not plants, participate in consciousness16. Hartmann’s psycho-
logical level would allow for such an extension if its orientation to Descartes’ dualism 
were loosened17. Today, one could appeal to the bioethical notions of sensation and 
suffering as a basis for distinguishing additional levels within organic reality. Recent 
findings in astrobiology also tend to support a subdivision of the organic. They sug-
gest that, whereas simple forms of life may exist almost everywhere in the universe, 
15 In the European cultural tradition, the distinction between the inorganic and the organic and the 
division of organic reality into plants, animals and humans formulated by Plato and Aristotle has 
shaped the ontology of the lifeworld since antiquity. Ingensiep (2001, 27, 59, 258) and Jahn (1985, 
63, 219 ff., 235) point to the connection to the doctrine of the ‘three natural spheres’ of minerals, 
plants and animals. For the historical development, see (Hartmann, 1943) and for the contempo-
rary lifeworld relevance, see (Schiemann, 2005, 43 ff., 118 ff., 130 ff.).
16 “It may be that the realm of reality that encompasses all organic life cannot be distinguished from 
that wider realm that, in its parts accessible to ordinary language, includes the knowledge of the 
human mind” (Heisenberg, 1984, 259).
17 Hartmann only attributes a ‘non-spiritual’ or ‘spiritless’ consciousness to animals: (Hartmann, 
1933, 48; Hartmann, 1942, 38).
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complex living beings may be very rare because their existence presupposes an ex-
tremely improbable concurrence of a large number of independent conditions (Ward, 
Brownlee, 1999).
Finally, in the case of the higher levels it is worth mentioning that for Hartmann, 
as already indicated by his terms ‘objective’ and ‘objectified’ spirit, the main factor is 
objectivity, whereas for Heisenberg it is subjectivity. In Hartmann, the higher levels 
are more strongly differentiated. Above the level of consciousness, he distinguishes 
three levels, Heisenberg only two. 
In what follows, I will confine myself to the problem of the classification of the 
properties of the very small and the very large.
4a) Properties of the very small
Both authors discuss whether the constitutive principles of the very small are 
different from those of other domains of reality. The central question is that of chance. 
Hartmann counts the causal nexus among the eleven categories of the inorganic level 
(Hartmann, 1950, 251 ff.), so that there cannot be any uncaused or random events 
at this level (Hartmann, 1950, 348, 370 ff.). Whereas Heisenberg assumes that quan-
tum theory necessitates the “recognition of chance,” Hartmann argues that one cannot 
speak of chance without falling into a contradiction (Heisenberg, 1984, 257). Even 
where chance is asserted, one must assume causality insofar as one expects events 
(Hartmann, 1950, 375). 
However, this notion of chance as relative to consciousness does not do jus-
tice to the current state of scientific knowledge. According to contemporary stand-
ard physical theories, the chance occurrence of individual events is independent of 
the subjective expectations of observers. The theories proposed thus far to explain 
quantized individual events through causal mechanisms have proven to be extremely 
problematic. They are forced to make assumptions that cannot be empirically veri-
fied and, compared to standard theories, are unconvincing in their structure, scope 
and predictive power. Above all, these approaches do not deny the irregularity of the 
quantized individual events18.
The lack of evidence of a causal nexus is not the only feature that distinguishes 
the very small from the larger dimensions. At this point I would like to supplement 
Heisenberg’s approach with further arguments for introducing a separate level of the 
very small. Properties such as spin and parity violation do not have any analog in 
other inorganic domains. The correlations between spatially distant quantum objects, 
18 See the relevant accounts in (Rae, 1996) and (Albert, 1992).
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which have also received good experimental confirmation for very small dimensions, 
and the simultaneous existence of different states of a quantum object occur at the 
macroscopic level, if at all, only in the transitional region to smaller dimensions and 
under special conditions19. In recent decades, research into the relationship between 
the strange states of the very small and the phenomena of the higher dimensions has 
shown that the transition between the two is reduced to a narrow time window20. 
All things considered, the properties of the very small seem to be irreducible and so 
delimitable as regards their properties that there are good reasons to consider the in-
troduction of a separate level21.
4b) Properties of the very large
Hartmann distinguishes within the inorganic level between “two closed series 
of dynamic structures separated by a gap” (Hartmann, 1950, 483). One of these series 
is formed by the ‘microsystems’ of atomic and subatomic dimensions, the other by 
the ‘macrosystems’ that begin with the “agglomerations of matter that form the stellar 
bodies and […] end with the great spiral galaxies […] or even with whole ‘swarms’ 
of such galaxies” (Hartmann, 1950, 484)22. In the gap between these two domains, 
according to Hartman, are located fragments of the macrosystems and organic na-
ture, which as it were “falls out” of the inorganic ladder (Stufenleiter) (Hartmann, 
1950, 485). 
Hartmann combines both series in one level because he is convinced that they 
are uniformly determined by the dimensional categories that also apply to organic re-
ality and by the specific system of categories of inorganic reality. In order to generate 
unity, he thinks that his theory of levels must reject not only the specific character-
istics of the submicroscopic level, but also the determinations of space and time that 
follow from physical theories of relativity. According to Hartman, space and time can-
not arise in the cosmos, space itself cannot be curved and an absolute simultaneity of 
events must be possible (Hartmann, 1950, 216 ff., 236 ff.). Hartmann thus adopts the 
19 These conditions are not only technically realizable, but could also be based on biological processes; 
see (Vedral, 2011). 
20 The transition from the very small to the larger phenomena is described in theories of ‘decoher-
ence.’ For an introduction, see for example (Joos, 2002).
21 With regard to the spatial order of magnitude of its objects, but not to the scope of its interactions 
beyond this, the level of the very small would extend from the immeasurably small (10–18 meters) 
to the dimensions of the atomic or the nanometer range (10–9 meters), which means that it would 
be situated beneath Heisenberg’s chemical level.
22 On Hartmann’s special interest in astronomy, see (Harich, 2004, 78 ff.).
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standpoint of Newtonian physics, which treats the intuitive understanding of space 
and time of the lifeworld as absolute23. 
However, such a generalization can no longer be regarded as straightforwardly 
compatible with the physical facts and the theories that deal with them. No direct-
ly perceivable relativistic effects occur on earth simply because of the comparatively 
short distances between events and of the low velocities and small sizes of the moving 
masses (Schiemann, 2015, 219)24. Although these effects start to occur continuously 
in the transition to the dimensions of the very large, their corporeal effectiveness, 
which only begins with high energies or strong fields, can be regarded as a reason for 
introducing a separate cosmic level25. Worlds in which relativistic changes in meas-
urements of time and distance acquired relevance for sensory perception (e.g. a fast 
moving space ship) would be qualitatively different from worlds in which this is not 
the case26. However, it is questionable whether the future technical possibilities will 
be sufficient to generate the amounts of energy per unit of time necessary for this 
(e.g. accelerating a space ship). The cosmic level, which in spatial terms only begins at 
an order of magnitude of interstellar distances, could remain inaccessible to humans 
(Schiemann, 2018)27.
The introduction of a cosmic level also suggests itself from the perspective of 
basic concepts. While the description of very small phenomena and those of interme-
diate size always presupposes the existence of space and time, the description of the 
world of the very large can include the emergence of space and time. The so-called Big 
Bang hypothesis asserts the beginning of space and time. Insofar as time is dependent 
on the gravitational field that exercises effects in very large dimensions, it loses its 
status as a basic concept for the construction of theories (Schiemann, 2015, 220 ff.).
23 Feyerabend (1963, 86) notes in general that “Hartmann’s approach [in his Philosophy of Nature]” 
leads him “to uphold the categories of classical physics.” On the relationship between the Newto-
nian understanding of space and time and that of the lifeworld, see (Schiemann, 2006, 126 ff.) and 
(Schiemann, 2015, 214 ff.).
24 The special theory of relativity has to be taken into account when it comes to understanding the 
processes in the regions of the subatomic that cannot be intuitively represented.
25 This reason belongs the philosophy of nature which deals with human beings’ relationship to nature 
and includes lifeworld experience such as corporeal effectiveness. It differs from natural science, 
and from a theory of science that is primarily interested in the conceptual foundations and formal 
structures of scientific theories, in virtue of its reference to human beings.
26 An example of the categorial difference between non-relativistic and relativistic worlds is ‘time 
travel,’ which is only possible in the latter. For an introduction, see (Wüthrich, 2007).
27 The closest star is around four light years distant from the earth.
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In the last decade, findings in astronomy and cosmological theories have lent 
additional support to the assumption that there may exist a level of the very large. 
Measurements of phenomena interpreted as an expression of the accelerated expan-
sion of the universe28 have led physicists to infer the existence of a form of energy 
whose properties and causes cannot be derived from known physical laws. This so-
called ‘dark energy’ makes up around 70 % of the total amounts of matter and ener-
gy present in the universe (Börner, 2008). It determines the future fate of the uni-
verse. Assuming that it remains constant, it will lead in the distant future of perhaps 
10100 years from now to the dissolution of all bodies and hence to the destruction of 
all life and its detectable traces (Schiemann, 2018). The universe confronts us not only 
with spatial extension and emptiness of a magnitude that is scarcely imaginable, but 
also with a hostility to life destined to increase in the long run that demonstrates the 
limits of every form of anthropocentrism.
5. CONCLUSION
My reflections on the levels of the very small and the very large are intended as 
attempts to take account of the results of historical changes in scientific knowledge 
for the two conceptions of levels of reality discussed above. In contrast to the other 
levels, the two newly added levels for the most part elude the intuitive representability 
of lifeworld experience. While the intermediate dimensions are directly accessible to 
experience, the very small and the very large dimensions can only be observed and 
influenced indirectly by means of technical aids. The two levels of the very small and 
the very large are of fundamental ontological importance. The very small is formed 
out of the constituents of the entire visible matter in the observable universe; the very 
large encompasses the total density of matter and energy of the observable universe29. 
Organic, psychological, conscious and spiritual reality (up to objectified spirit or the 
creative forces) is framed, as it were, by these two levels. This suggests an overarching 
tripartite division of all levels into the very small, the intermediate and the very large 
dimensions.
As examples of a scientific worldview, Hartmann’s and Heisenberg’s concep-
tions are open to change that can lead to the idea of levels itself being placed in ques-
tion. From a theoretical point of view, here we should take note of the improvement 
28 The phenomena in question include the velocity of an exploding supernovae, for whose measure-
ment the Nobel Prize in physics was awarded in 2011.
29 The term ‘visible matter’ refers to the so-called baryonic matter, the term ‘observable universe’ to 
the part of the universe accessible to experience from the earth.
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in the conditions for realizing the program of a reductionist explanation of the world 
rejected by Heisenberg in his manuscript and by Hartmann in general. The forms 
of scientific reductionism currently widespread in science reject level models on the 
grounds that all phenomena can be explained in physical terms30. They rely heavily 
on the impressive advances in physical explanations of phenomena in the life sciences. 
However, as long as this program, notwithstanding the progress that has been made, 
remains as far from realization as it is today, non-reductionist forms of physicalism 
also have some justification. They assume that phenomena of one level must be de-
scribable in a language that cannot be derived from the properties of the lower level 
(Beckermann, 1999, 216 ff.). However, this independence does not necessarily imply 
inexplicability, as Hartmann and Heisenberg claim for some of their specific level 
concepts.
Also at odds with the notion of levels are the enhanced technical possibilities 
for manipulating and producing phenomena. The increasing susceptibility of nature 
to technical control has rendered the boundaries between the levels permeable in new 
ways. The transitions between the inorganic and the organic have become the fo-
cus of laboratory investigations, and techniques for influencing conscious processes 
through medical interventions has entered the phase of neuroenhancement. As dif-
ferences have become leveled, the possibility of the multi-realizability of previously 
unique phenomenal properties has gained in importance. In the future, it may be pos-
sible to produce technical systems that have essentially different structural properties 
from natural organisms and yet resemble them as living beings. Multi-realizability 
could also imply connecting levels previously separated by an intermediate level and 
thus could contradict the already mentioned law of indifference according to which 
an upper level is dependent on all levels lower relative to it. An example would be the 
much-discussed intention of research on artificial intelligence to build machines that 
could not be classified as organic, but nevertheless had capabilities equivalent to the 
cognitive abilities of human consciousness.
If scientifically oriented level conceptions were to be increasingly problema-
tized or abolished by the sciences themselves, this would not necessarily impair the 
lifeworld plausibilities to which the two authors appeal. If we understand the lifeworld 
not as a category that comprises culture or nature, but as a limited domain of expe-
rience in which the attention of adults is devoted to non-professional dealings with 
familiar things and persons as they appear intuitively in external perception, then the 
30 Esfeld, Sachse (2009, 90) provide an example of physicalist reductionism that rejects “levels of prop-
erties in the world” but not “levels of complexity in the configurations of physical properties.”
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term can be assigned to a specific form of knowledge with its own ways of understand-
ing the world (Schiemann, 2005, 89 ff.). In contrast to the scientific notions of levels, 
the typification of the lifeworld starts with things that belong to one or several levels. 
The above-mentioned division of the world into inorganic reality, plants, animals and 
human beings can serve as an example of such a classification that stands parallel to 
the two conceptions of levels31. From the perspective of the lifeworld, there is also a 
categorial difference between classes of phenomena which, remarkably enough, is not 
thematized as such in the two level conceptions: Natural objects are contrasted with 
technical objects, with nature being conceived as that which can change without hu-
man intervention, while technical objects owe their existence to human production. 
The fact that Heisenberg and Hartmann did not envisage a technical level or domain 
can be criticized as an element of their approaches that is at odds with the lifeworld32.
However, the increasing technologization of the lifeworld is one of the factors 
of social change that has the potential to eliminate intuitive representability as a nec-
essary condition of lifeworld experience, and hence also to undermine the foundation 
of the non-scientific intelligibility of the intermediate levels. Although the conception 
of the world as comprising levels may seem plausible at present, its future develop-
ment must be regarded as uncertain.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Ciaran Cronin for his excellent translation of the Ger-
man original.
REFERENCES
Albert, D. Z. (1992). Quantum Mechanics and Experience. Cambridge (USA): Harvard University Press.
Beckermann, A. (1999). Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin/New York: de 
Gruyter.
Bollnow, O. F. (1982). Lebendige Vergangenheit. Zum Begriff des objektivierten Geistes bei Nicolai 
Hartmann. In A. J. Buch (Ed.), Nicolai Hartmann 1882–1982 (70–84). Bonn: Bouvier Verlag.
31 Cf. (Hartmann, 1943, 180 ff.), (Schiemann, 2005, 42 ff.) and n.16.
32 On the difference between nature and technology from a lifeworld perspective, see (Schiemann, 
2005). Heisenberg sees a close connection between science and technology (Schiemann, 2008, 
115 ff.), which may be why he did without a separate technical area. Hartmann regards technology 
as a “spiritual domain ‘devoid of tradition’” whose products he assigns to the level of objectified 
spirit (Hartmann, 1933, 246 ff., 418). See also the discussion of technology in (Hartmann, 1942, 
79 ff.).
HORIZON 8 (1) 2019 121
Börner, G. (2008). Die Dunkle Energie und ihre Feinde. Spektrum der Wissenschaft, 11, 38–45.
Esfeld, M., & Sachse, Ch. (2009). Identität statt Emergenz. Plädoyer für einen konservativen Reduk-
tionismus. In J. Greve & A. Schnabel (Eds.), Emergenz: Zur Analyse und Erklärung komplexer 
Strukturen (84–110). Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Feyerabend, P. (1963). Professor Hartmann’s Philosophy of Nature. Ratio, 5, 91–106. 
Goethe, J. W. von. (1989). Schriften zur allgemeinen Naturlehre, Geologie und Mineralogie. In Sämtli-
che Werke, Bd. 25. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Harich, W. (2004). Nicolai Hartmann. Größe und Grenzen. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
Hartmann, N. (1933). Das Problem des geistigen Seins. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Geschicht-
sphilosophie und der Geisteswissenschaften. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Hartmann, N. (1940). Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Kategorienlehre. Meisenheim 
am Glan: Westkultur Verlag Anton Hain.
Hartmann, N. (1942). Neue Wege der Ontologie. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Hartmann, N. (1943). Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der Alten Philosophie. Abhandlungen 
der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, No. 3. Berlin: 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, in Kommission bei de Gruyter.
Hartmann, N. (1946). Neue Ontologie in Deutschland. In Kleinere Schriften, Bd. 1 (51–89). Berlin: de 
Gruyter 1955.
Hartmann, N. (1950). Philosophie der Natur. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Hartmann, N. (1953). New Ways of Ontology. Chicago: H. Regnery Co.
Heil, J. (2005). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heisenberg, W. (1984). Die Ordnung der Wirklichkeit. In Gesammelte Werke: Abt. C, Bd. I: Physik und 
Erkenntnis: 1927–1955 (217–306). Berlin: Springer.
Heisenberg, W. (1989). Die Ordnung der Wirklichkeit. Zürich/München: Piper.
Höfert, H.-J. (1952). Kategorialanalyse und physikalische Grundlagenforschung. In H. Heimsoeth & 
R. Heiss (Eds.), Nicolai Hartmann: Der Denker und sein Werk. 15 Abhandlungen mit einer Biblio-
graphie (186–207). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Ingensiep, H. W. (2001). Geschichte der Pflanzenseele: Philosophische und biologische Entwürfe von der 
Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag.
Jahn, I. (Ed.). (1985). Geschichte der Biologie: Theorien, Methoden, Institutionen, Kurzbiographien. Jena: 
VEB Gustav Fischer.
Joos, E. (2002). Dekohärenz und der Übergang von der Quantenphysik zur klassischen Physik. In J. Au-
dretsch (Ed.), Verschränkte Welt. Physik und Philosophie korrelierter Quantensysteme (169–195). 
Berlin: Wiley-VCH. 
Rae, A. I. M. (1996). Quantenphysik: Illusion oder Realität? Stuttgart: Reclam.
Robinson, D. (1992). Renormalization and the Effective Field Theory Programme. In D. Hull, 
M. Forbes & K. Okruhlik, PSA 1992 I (393–403). East Lansing Mich.: Philosophy of Science 
Association.
Schiemann, G. (2005). Natur, Technik, Geist: Kontexte der Natur nach Aristoteles und Descartes in le-
bensweltlicher und subjektiver Erfahrung. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
Schiemann, G. (2006). Zweierlei Raum. Über die Differenz von lebensweltlichen und physikalischen 
Raumvorstellungen. In E. Uhl & M. Ott (Eds.), Denken des Raums in Zeiten der Globalisierung 
(124–134). Stuttgart: LIT Verlag.
Schiemann, G. (2008). Werner Heisenberg. München: Beck.
Schiemann, G. (2009). Werner Heisenberg’s Position on a Hypothetical Conception of Science. In 
M. Heidelberger & G. Schiemann (Eds.), The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sci-
ences (251–267). Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. 
122 GREGOR SCHIEMANN
Schiemann, G. (2012). Mehr Seinsschichten für die Welt? Vergleich und Kritik der Schichtenkonzep-
tion von Nicolai Hartmann und Werner Heisenberg. In G. Hartung, C. Strube & M. Wunsch 
(Eds.), Nicolai Hartmann — Von der Systemphilosophie zur Systemischen Philosophie (85–104). 
Berlin: de Gruyter.
Schiemann, G. (2015). Lebensweltliche und physikalische Zeit. In G. Hartung (Ed.), Mensch und Zeit — 
Zur Frage der Synchronisation von Zeitstrukturen (207–225). Wiesbaden: Springer.
Schiemann, G. (2018). The Coming Emptiness: On the Meaning of the Emptiness of the Universe in 
Natural Philosophy. Philosophies, 2019, 4(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4010001 
Stephan, A. (1999). Emergenz. Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation. Dresden: Dresden 
Univ. Press.
Vedral, V. (2011). Leben in der Quantenwelt. Spektrum der Wissenschaft, 9, 32–38.
Ward, P., & Brownlee, D. (1999). Rare Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Universe. New 
York: Copernicus Books.
Wüthrich, Ch. (2007). Zeitreisen und Zeitmaschinen. In Th. Müller (Ed.), Philosophie der Zeit. Neue 
analytische Ansätze (191–219). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
